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ABSTRACT 
Academic and administrative staff involved in the budget process in four 
small-medium universities in Ontario responded to a 16-page mail questionnaire 
on budgeting attitude as it relates to content, context, process, environmental 
outcomes, and personal factors. The results showed that for this setting, budgetees 
seem to have positive budget attitudes, high academic satisfaction levels, and high 
commitment levels. There was some dissatisfaction expressed, however, with 
many economic facets, including the university budget, the faculty budgets, the 
university's long-range plans, and the university's external relations. The 
personal budget history and values as motivators appeared to have less of an effect 
on budgetary attitude than did the respondent's definition of a budget, the 
perception of a consultative, fair superior-subordinate leadership style, and the 
fact that the superior holds the budgetee personally accountable for budget 
variances within the department. As hypothesized, there was not a significant 
difference in budget attitude scores between those of an administrative back-
ground and those of an academic background. Objectives for administrators in 
this particular environment are discussed. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Les membres du personnel administratif et du corps enseignant associés au 
processus d'organisation budgétaire au sein de quatre petites oy moyennes 
universités de l'Ontario ont été invités à répondre à un questionnaire de 16pages 
qui leur a été envoyé par courrier et portait sur leur comportement en matière de 
planification budgétaire. Ce comportement était analysé en tenant compte des 
mesures d'application et du contexte d'élaboration du budget, des diverses 
méthodes de travail, des effets attendus sur le milieu et de divers facteurs 
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individuels. Les résultats ont montré que, dans les limites de ce cadre, les 
responsables des budgets avaient une attitude positive, un niveau de satisfaction 
professionnelle élevé et un niveau de motivation excellent. On a pu percevoir 
toutefois un certain mécontentement vis-à-vis de plusieurs aspects d'ordre plutôt 
économique : le budget dont dispose leur université, les fonds alloués aux diverses 
facultés, la planification à long terme de l'université et les relations que cette 
dernière entretient avec le monde extérieur. Le parcours professionnel et financier 
des responsables de budgets est apparu comme un élément de motivation moindre 
que i idée que ceux-ci se faisaient d'un budget; en effet, perçoivent-ils une gestion 
fondée sur la consultation comme une relation juste entre supérieur et subalterne? 
Pensent-ils que leur supérieur les considèrent comme personnellement responsables 
des différences de répartition qui pourraient avoir lieu au sein d'un département? 
Conformément aux hypothèses émises, il n'y a pas vraiment de différence de 
comportement entre ceux qui ont une formation en administration et ceux qui 
ont une formation de professeur. L'article présente de plus quelques objectifs 
dont les administrateurs pourraient tenir compte dans ce milieu particulier. 
Within the management accounting and social science literature there is much 
speculation about the uses of budgets and the budget-setting process, but there is 
little reported on budgeting attitudes of budgeting personnel within universities. 
While most of the work in this setting has focused on retrenchment strategies, 
particularly in larger universities (Belanger & Tremblay, 1982; Hardy, 1988; 
Hardy, 1987; Hardy, 1984; Hardy et al., 1983), a major void exists regarding the 
budgetary attitudes of those responsible for budgeting within small and medium 
universities. This paper presents survey findings of such within four universities in 
Ontario. 
In this study, budget attitude, the dependent measure, was related to three sets of 
factors: the university environment and its content, context, and process variables; 
the environmental outcome variables of budgetees' satisfaction and commitment 
levels; and the budgetees' personal outcome variables. The research model is 
shown in Figure 1. 
As in Collins' studies (Collins et al., 1987; Collins et al., 1984; Collins, 1978), 
"positive budget attitude" was expressed as a positive motivation, measured by the 
extent to which an individual desires to make a personal effort to achieve the 
budget and to induce budgetary responsiveness in subordinates. "Negative budget 
attitude" was expressed as a negative motivation, measured by the extent to which 
a person withholds his or her support from the budget, attempts to induce slack in 
the budget, or inputs erroneous or incompatible data into the budgetary system. 
Considering that universities in North America have recently had to deal with 
reduced funding, Ontario was selected for study because of its relatively rigid 
budgetary environment. Within the last decade, the provincial government has 
consistently provided less than the budget recommended by the intermediary body 
(Hardy, 1988). 
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Figure 1 
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Researchers (Zammuto & Cameron, 1985; Parker & Zammuto, 1986) have 
argued that in times of cutbacks and fiscal restraint, external factors such as the 
state of the general economy, the mandates of the provincial governments, and 
other more randomly-occurring events (such as strikes) need to be differentiated 
for large, generalist universities and smaller, more specialist ones. Smaller 
educational institutions are sensitized to environmental changes. While tough 
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external factors may cause larger institutions to shut departments or reduce student 
admissions to survive, smaller universities are typically forced to change their 
specialist orientations (Hardy et al., 1983; Hardy, 1984). For this reason, this 
study focused on the budget attitudes within incumbents of small and medium 
universities. 
THE UNIVERSITY AND ITS CONTENT, CONTEXT, 
AND PROCESS FACTORS 
Pettigrew (1984) maintains that in order to understand how organizations deal with 
budgetary restrictions, three components of strategy-making must be considered: 
content, context, and process. "Content" refers to what should be cut or restricted, 
"process" refers to how cutbacks or restrictions are to be carried out, and "context" 
refers to how the size, diversity, formal governance mechanisms, and culture 
influence the cutback or restriction process (Hardy, 1987). 
In universities, the content of cutbacks or restrictions is much more limited than 
it is in industry. Because of tenure and collective agreements with faculty 
associations, lay-offs, department closures, and overly-restrictive departmental 
budgets are unwelcome. Regarding process, university presidents cannot impose 
directives on the organization without consulting with other groups in this 
decentralized, professional bureaucracy (Mintzberg, 1979; Hardy, 1988). Finally, 
given that different universities have variations in size, governance, and culture, 
what may be an acceptable strategy in one institution may be totally unacceptable 
or inappropriate in another (Blau, 1973). 
Hardy (1988) suggests that four configurations representing different combina-
tions of content, context, and process factors are common in larger universities in 
particular: (i) decentralized democracies, (ii) centralized technocracies, (iii) 
compartmentalized bureaucracies, and (iv) sectarian universities. [The reader is 
referred to this paper for definitions of the types.] 
Considering these four configurations, the process in universities can generally 
be referred to as centralized (whereby others in the organization perceive that the 
centralized administration is guilty of "differential" resource allocation policies), 
or as decentralized (whereby others in the organization perceive that the 
decentralized administration of the budgeting process is fair and equitable, even at 
the departmental level; Hardy, 1987; Hardy et al., 1983). 
ENVIRONMENTAL OUTCOMES RELATED TO THE BUDGETEES' 
SATISFACTION AND COMMITMENT LEVELS 
Universities are non-profit organizations, constantly under pressure to be fiscally 
efficient yet politically effective in recruiting and retaining a productive, talented 
professoriate (Alsupetal . , 1988; Hardy, 1987; Pearson, 1986). When successful, 
such universities boast a motivated, satisfied, and committed faculty. Thus, 
successful budgeting within universities implies both economic and political 
astuteness. The former relates to efficiency and effective resource allocation, 
while the latter refers to the ability to reduce conflict between competing political 
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factions in order to optimize employee satisfaction and commitment levels - to the 
university, the faculty, the department, and the job (Hardy, 1987; Warmsley & 
Zald, 1973). 
While the literature seems to suggest that decentralized institutional environ-
ments allow for greater participation in the budget-setting process and thus 
increase the likelihood of higher levels of satisfaction and commitment for 
professionals, there are discrepancies in conclusions between theoretical and 
empirical work. While some evidence suggests that increased budgetary participa-
tion creates a more satisfied work force (Kennis, 1979; Otley, 1977), other 
evidence (Stedry, 1960) suggests that participation does not produce as good a 
performance as an "optimal" imposed budget. Other factors such as personality 
type and organizational size are also important (Lyne, 1988; Searfoss & Monczha, 
1973). When the employee is already over-loaded with work, a reasonable 
imposed budget may be more palatable and conducive to higher satisfaction levels 
than actual participation in the budget-setting process. 
THE BUDGETEES' PERSONAL OUTCOMES AND 
BUDGET ATTITUDE 
Role senders (Collins et al., 1984), leadership styles (Collins et al., 1984; Collins 
et al., 1987), and role stress (Collins et al., 1984; Clancy, 1978) reportedly affect 
budget attitudes. A positive attitude seems to be evoked when the budget is 
perceived to be a motivational rather than a punitive tool; that is, when a budget is 
perceived to be a target or goal to be aimed for (Lyne, 1988; Taylor, 1947; Stedry, 
1960; Hofstede, 1968; Tosi, 1975; Ronen & Livingstone, 1975). 
When the effect of performance evaluation on budget attitude is considered, 
findings are inconsistent. While some studies have suggested that the heavy use of 
budget variances in performance evaluation is associated with positive budget 
attitudes (Collins et al., 1984), others have reported dysfunctional attitudes and 
behaviour resulting from such intense pressure (Argyris, 1952; Bruns & 
Waterhouse, 1975; Otley, 1978; Hirst, 1983; Brownell, 1982). Schiff & Lewin 
(1970) concluded that for most organizations, positive motivation can be 
maintained as long as the pressure to meet the budget is kept at a moderate level 
during the performance evaluation stage. 
For the professoriate, in particular, their complex "role" is significant in 
defining the relevance of budgeting. The productivity of faculty is reportedly 
influenced by the availability of resources for fulfilling their roles in teaching, 
research, and service (Alsup et al., 1988; Schell & Loeb, 1986). Given the scarce 
resource of time for performing these functions, the professoriate appear to prefer 
to make their time spent teaching, for example, to count twice; that is, teaching 
must furnish material for research or otherwise be a part of the research process 
(Summers, 1972; Schell & Loeb, 1986). Other matters perceived to be less 
relevant to their self-actualization are delegated elsewhere. Faculty appear to be 
agreeable to having budget directors and budget committees to take care of 
budgetary matters, the Senate to accommodate academic matters (Hardy, 1988; 
Weick, 1976), and unions to deal with the economic aspects of the work situation 
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(Schell & Loeb, 1986; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1984; Ponak & Thompson, 1984; 
Feuille & Blandin, 1974; Bigoness, 1978). 
HYPOTHESES 
Considering the literature and the predictors outlined in Figure 1, the following 
hypotheses were made: 
1. Small and medium universities would be characterized as a decentralized 
democracy by administrators and faculty members responsible for budgeting. 
2. For the respondents cited above, a positive budget attitude would be prevalent. 
3. Given reported norms of academic satisfaction level, economic satisfaction 
level, and commitment level for administrators and faculty responsible for 
budgeting in larger universities, similar patterns would exist for counterparts in 
the small and medium university system. More specifically, the patterns in the 
small and medium universities would more closely resemble the democratic 
larger systems than the technocratic larger systems. 
4. Given reported perceptions of administrators and faculty responsible for 
budgeting in larger universities, the counterparts in the small and medium 
university system would similarly perceive that the provincial government and 
the general economy are more responsible for the current budgeting constraints 
in universities than are other internal university factors. 
5. Given reported findings about faculty in general, the administrators and faculty 
responsible for budgeting in small and medium universities would have similar 
traits; namely, that: 
- the budget would be perceived as a measure of university administrators' 
competence rather than as a personally punitive or corrective performance 
evaluation measure. 
- the personal budget histories of those responsible for budgeting within small 
and medium universities would reflect fiscally responsible types. 
- the value system of the aforementioned respondents would reflect the need to 
embellish one's ego, primarily through lasting accomplishments like 
research and publications rather than through other means. 
- the superior-subordinate relationship preferred by the respondents would be 
consultative and not personally punitive. 
6. Given the scarce resource of time within the small and medium university 
setting, budget attitude of the respondents would likely be correlated with 
budgetees' perceptions of the effectiveness of others responsible for budgeting 
(e.g., budget committees, budget directors, deans, department chairs) and with 
economic satisfaction. The correlation between budget attitude and the 
remaining personal outcome variables would likely be less significant. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
A 144-item questionnaire was sent to individuals responsible for budgeting in 
small and medium universities (classified by size of student population) in 
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Ontario, Canada. The following four universities agreed to participate, provided 
that the results had as the unit of analysis the budgetee rather than the university: 
Trent University, University of Guelph, Lakehead University, and University of 
Windsor. 
Procedure 
Questionnaires were sent to 280 faculty and administrators at these universities in 
November, 1988. This number represents the census of those listed in the 1987-88 
Directory of Academic and Administrative Officers at Canadian Universities 
produced by the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada. For the initial 
mailout, 187 (67%) were classified as "academics" by background (Presidents, 
Vice-presidents Academic, Deans, School or Department Directors, Librarians, 
and Faculty). The remaining 93 (33%) were classified as "administrators" by 
background (Chief Budget Officers, Vice-Presidents of Finance, and so on). 
Approximately one week after the initial mailout, reminder cards were sent to 
all 280 potential respondents. By processing time, 143 questionnaires were re-
turned, yielding a corrected response rate of 51%. 
For this study sample, 87% of the respondents were male, and 13% were 
female. The average age of respondents was 48 years. The breakdown of the 
sample according to current position was as follows: academic administrator, 
chairman: 34%; academic administrator, dean: 14.5%; budget committee mem-
ber: 1.4%; service department, director: 17.4%; service department, manager or 
department head: 15.9%; chief budget officer: 2.2%; other: 14.5%. The sample 
results revealed good representation across the specialties involved with the 
budgeting process. Because no data were collected on institutional affiliation, a 
breakdown on this variable was not possible. 
Questionnaire 
The 16-page questionnaire consisted of nine sections. Part I, consisting of nine 
possible definitions of budgeting, was developed along the lines suggested by 
Arnold (1981). Part II, designed to identify respondents' understanding of their 
university's budget practices and to ascertain the university environment typing, 
was developed along the work of Arnold (1981). Part III consisted of two sections: 
the first delineated the kinds of control measures associated with the university's 
budget practices (based on Merchant's work, 1985), whereas the second dealt with 
the perceived superior-subordinate leadership style (Collins et al., 1984). Part IV, 
the dependent measure part, consisted of nine budget attitude items developed by 
Collins (1978) and used repeatedly (Collins et al., 1984; Collins et al., 1987). 
Given that no reliability measure for this nine-item index has been reported, a 
Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient was computed for all nine items using this 
study's data. The results yielded a reliability coefficient of only 0.47, which is 
inadequate by social science standards. Two items were found to lower the overall 
index reliability: "I often exceed my approved budget objectives" and "I frequently 
feel a personal sense of failure when budget objectives are not met." After these 
16 Bernadette H. Schell and Debra Tarnopolsky 
two items were deleted from this index, the Cronbach alpha reliability coefficient 
was improved to 0.61. This more reliable 7-item budget attitude index was used 
for the statistical analyses. Part V, detailing the impact of budgetary outcomes on 
performance assessment, was based on the work of Collins (1978; Collins et al., 
1984; Collins et al., 1987). Part VI dealt with the political and economic 
environmental outcome variables in Figure 1. The items were derived from 
Hardy's work (1987). Part VII, based on the work of Rokeach (1973), asked the 
respondents to rank order from most important to least important 18 instrumental 
(desirable modes of conduct) and 18 terminal (desirable end-states of existence) 
values. Part VIII, developed by the researchers, dealt with how the respondent 
handles his or her personal finances. Items asked such facets as: if the respondent 
manages his/her family finances, the degree to which he/she is involved in the 
management of household income, whether or not he/she regularly puts funds 
aside in anticipation of future expenses, whether he/she ordinarily borrows funds 
for purchases which he/she cannot afford, and so on. Part IX included the 
background items typically found in surveys of this type. 
RESULTS 
The Environment in Small and Medium Universities 
When presented with seven statements which assessed the respondents' views 
about the way the university allocates resources among faculties and departments 
(see Table 1), the administrators and faculty alike agreed that resource allocation 
decisions are based on what objectivity seems best for the university overall, and 
that the university has a standard set of procedures it uses to make resource 
allocation decisions. Beyond this overall objective of what is best for the 
university is best for the majority, the respondents seem to feel that the "share of 
the pie" is then sliced according to political factions. Given a choice between items 
suggesting an autocracy or that of a democracy, the findings suggest that resource 
allocation is more likely to be a matter for group discussion and concensus rather 
than one that is decided autocratically. The majority, 70%, confirmed that budget 
committees exist in their institutions, and were perceived to be, on the average, 
moderately effective. When asked how important various groups or individuals 
were in influencing decision outcomes in general at their universities, the rankings 
from most important to least important were as follows: central administration, 
deans, department heads, professors. This pattern appears to be reflective of a 
decentralized system that is perceived to be fair rather than differential. Such a 
finding supports hypothesis 1. 
Regarding the budget process, the respondents agreed that decisions in the 
university's budget process are made at high levels in the chain of command. The 
respondents said that not only are representatives of all groups in the university 
included in the budget process, but that they felt that budget responsibilities are 
controlled through specific procedures, not arbitrarily defined ones. When given a 
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Table 1 
Views About How the University Allocates Resources Beween Faculties/Department: 
How would you respond to each item below, on a 1 through 5 scale? 
1 - totally disagree 
5 - totally agree 
N = 135 
The university has a standard set of 2.91 1.10 
procedures it uses to make resource 
allocation decisions. 
One individual makes all resource 2.44 1.21 
allocation decisions of any consequence. 
No particular pattern characterizes the 2.22 1.05 
process by which resource allocation 
decisions are made. 
Resource allocation decisions are 2.70 1.11 
political, based on the relative power 
of those involved. 
Resource allocation is decided 2.50 1.10 
autocratically. 
Resource allocation is a matter for 2.66 0.90 
group discussion and concensus. 
Resource allocation decisions are based 3.23 0.87 
on what objectively seems best for the 
university overall. 
choice between headcount controls, financial controls limiting the expenditure 
level, procedural restriction controls, or "directive" controls as the predominant 
measure for limiting discretionary expenditures, the majority perceived financial 
controls to be the most significant in their institutions. When asked to what extent 
faculty/department budget over-expenditures are forgiven, the majority of 
respondents suggested a system which was moderately forgiving. These findings 
also support hypothesis 1. 
Budget Attitudes 
Responses were averaged to yield a measure of overall budget attitude for each 
respondent; the higher the score, the more positive the budget attitude. For this 
particular study group, the mean overall budget attitude index score on a 7-point 
scale was 5.05 (SD : 0.77, N = 129). Such findings support hypothesis 2. 
To assess the relative impact of the background variables on budget attitude, 
one-way analyses of variance with sex, age, tenure in position, and so on, were 
completed. Because not one of the biographical variables appeared to have a 
significant association with budget attitude, the multivariate statistical analyses 
were based on the pooled sample of faculty and administrators. 
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Table 2 
Views About Some Environmental Outcomes: Large, Small, and Medium Universities 
How would you respond to each item below, on a 1 through 5 scale? 
1 - very poor 
2 - poor 
3 - average 
4 - good 






Democratic M (SD) 
Small-Medium 
University 
1. Your present 3.7 
annual salary. 
2. The extent of 2.8 
faculty 






3. Your general 2.8 
confidence in the 
leadership of your 
faculty. 
4. Your general 2.7 
confidence in the 
leadership of the 
university. 
5. The value of Senate 2.6 
as an avenue for 
faculty influence. 
3.5 3.6 (0.89) 
3.4 3.7 (0.88) 
3.4 3.0 (0.98) 
Source: Hardy, 1987, p. 77 
The Environmental Outcomes in Small and Medium Universities 
Data comparing the mean scores of items relating to environmental outcome 
variables of large and small-to-medium universities are presented in Tables 2 , 3 , 
and 4. For each table, the first column presents findings for a technocratic large 
university, the second column presents such for a democratic large university, and 
the third column presents this study's findings for small-to-medium universities. 
Data in the first two columns were obtained from Hardy (1987). 
Because no standard deviation scores were cited for the larger university 
systems, only patterns of similarities and contrasts can be discussed here. The data 
in Tables 2 through 4 reveal that the mean scores for the items relating to 
environmental outcomes are much closer to the scores previously published for the 
democratic large university system than for the technocratic large university 
system. Such findings support hypothesis 3. 
For data in these tables, if one were to assume that a mean score value of 3 is 
indicative of general discontent regarding the facet in question, the findings from 
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Table 3 
Commitment Levels of Budgetees: Large, Small, and Medium Universities 
How would you rate your commitment to the following, on a 1 through 5 scale? 
1 - low 
5 - high 
Item 
1. The university 
2. Your faculty 
3. Your department 













N = 122 







Source: Hardy, 1987, p. 78 
this study would suggest that in general faculty in technocratic large universities 
are more likely to be discontent with a number of outcomes. The data reveal that 
for the technocratic larger university, 60% of the mean scores were below 3, while 
only 24% of the mean scores were below 3 for the large, small, and medium 
democratic university systems. For the small and medium universities, the major 
areas of discontent were with faculty budgets, university budgets, long-range 
university plans, and external/public relations. In short, hypothesis 3 was 
supported. 
Factors Responsible for Current Budgetary Constraints 
When asked about the factors responsible for current budgetary constraints in 
small and medium universities, the respondents seemed to agree that the 
government is the most responsible, followed by the general economy, the 
university administration, the faculty, and other factors. Such findings support 
hypothesis 4. 
Personal Outcome Factors and Budget Attitudes in Small and 
Medium Universities 
(i) Definition of budget. Of nine definitions offered, the definition receiving the 
highest mean score was: "A budget is a visual indication that the university is being 
run properly." Such a finding is consistent with hypothesis 5. 
(ii) Personal budget history of respondents. The majority, 88% of the 
respondents, attest to managing their personal and/or family finances. For the 
remaining 12% who do not, the spouse is the most likely individual to do so (83% 
of the 12% suggested such). The respondents also reported: putting funds aside in 
anticipation of future expenses, not borrowing funds for purchases which they 
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Table 4 
Satisfaction Levels of Budgetees: Large, Small, and Medium Universities 
How satisfied are you with the degree of influence faculty members have over 
the following, using a 1 through 5 scale7 
1 - very dissatisfied 
2 - fairly dissatisfied 
3 - neutral 
4 - fairly satisfied 
5 - very satisfied 
Item Technocratic JI 
Large University 
1. Curriculum 3.4 
2. Faculty appointments 2.9 
3.4 3. Selection of 
department heads 
4. Promotion and 
tenure 
2.9 
5. Faculty budget 2.0 
6. University budget 1.8 
7. Long-range 1.9 
university plans 








2 . 4 
2.1 
2.4 
2 . 8 
N = 132 











Source: Hardy, 1987, p. 78 
cannot afford on a current basis, rarely having bank accounts go into overdraft, and 
not having had wages garnisheed. Such a pattern supports hypothesis 5. 
(iii) Value systems. The values receiving the lowest mean ranks on the Rokeach 
Human Values Inventory (1973), whereby the lower the score the higher the 
importance level were: the instrumental values of honesty and capability, and the 
terminal values of a sense of accomplishment and lasting contribution and a need 
for self-respect. The least needed instrumental value was obedience, while the 
least important terminal value was salvation. Such results support hypothesis 5. 
(iv) Superior-subordinate leadership styles. When budgetees rated four factors 
on the actual influence each has on forming their budget attitudes, the immediate 
superior was perceived to be the most influential in determining respondents' 
budget attitudes. 
Five items were presented that asked about the impact of budgetary outcomes on 
performance assessment of the budgetees. The mean scores for the items are given 
in Table 5, along with the mean item scores for 128 budgetees in large industry 
firms. The results indicate that while consultation with the immediate superior 
appears to exist in universities, accountability by budgetees for budgetary 
outcomes appears to play a minimal role in performance assessment in the small 
and medium university setting, consistent with hypothesis 5. 
21 
Budgeting Attitudes in Smaller Universities: A Function of the 
Environment, Environmental Outcomes, and Personal Outcomes 
Table 5 
Factors Affecting Impact of Budgetary Outcomes on Performance Assessment: 
Large Firm Budgetees and Small and Medium University Budgetees 
Regarding your immediate superior, indicate your degree of agreement or 
disagreement, using a 1 through 6 scale. 
1 - totally disagree 
6 - totally agree 
N = 132 
Item Budgetees M Budgetees M (SD) 
Large Firm Small-Medium 
University 
1. My superior has 2.61 
expressed dissatisfaction 
to me about the results in 
my department when the 
budget has not been met. 
2. Large budget variances in 3.00 
my department are interpreted 
as poor performance. 
3. Budget variances in my 3.48 
department have been 
mentioned to me during 
performance evaluation 
interviews by my supervisor. 
4. I have to explain to my 3.26 
superior budget variances 
over which I have no control. 
5. My superior has held me 3.35 
personally accountable for 
budget variances in my 
department. 
Source: Collins et al, 1984, p. 168 
Summary and Review of Figure 1 
A Pearson correlation matrix was computed which produced the coefficients 
between budget attitude index and each metric predictor item in Figure 1. To save 
space, the results are not presented here but are available from the authors. In total, 
45 variables were found to have a coefficient significant at p < 0.05. To develop a 
"short list" of the most influential predictors, a forward-inclusion, multiple 
regression analysis was completed with budget attitude as the dependent variable 
and with these 45 predictors. The results are presented in Table 6. As suggested in 
hypothesis 6, effective use of time and energy appears to underlie the results of 
Table 6. The predictor most highly and positively correlated with budget attitude 
was the budgetees' satisfaction with the degree to which faculty members within 
small-medium settings are permitted to influence faculty and departmental 
budgets. The next two influential predictors were the degree to which faculty 
members could influence the public image of the university and the degree of 
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Table 6 
Summary of Forward Inclusion Multiple Linear Regression: 
Overall Budget Attitude as the Dependent Variable (N = 132) 
2 
Step Multiple R Adjusted F for Change in F for Variable B 
E 2 2 
R Equations £ Change Entered+ 
1 0, .565 0. . 319 0. . 305 23 . 86*** 0 . 319 23 . 86*** FDB 0, .565 
2 0 , .666 0. .444 0. .422 19. . 94*** 0 . 125 11. . 24** EXT 0. . 385 
3 0. .747 0 . , 557 0 .  530 20. .56*** 0 . 114 12. . 56** EFF 0 , . 387 
4 0. .793 0. .629 0 .  598 20 . ,31*** 0 . 071 9 , .22** SAL 0. . 276 
5 0. , 820 0. .672 0. .637 19. .25*** 0 . 043 6. . 20* HEF 0. . 233 
1. FDB: Satisfaction with degree of influence faculty have in 
determining faculty/department budgets. 
2. EXT: Satisfaction with degree of influence faculty have in 
determining external/public relations. 
3. EFF: Perceived degree of effectiveness of university budget 
committee. 
4. SAL: Satisfaction with present salary. 
5. HEF: Perceived system's effectiveness of allocating budget amounts 
for expenditures. 
*** p < 0.000 
** p < 0.001 
* p < 0.05 
6, faculty perceive that they make the best use of their time by getting involved in 
the "local" budget politics of the faculty or department rather than getting involved 
in setting budget policy for other units or for the university as a whole. Such a job is 
better left to an effective budget committee. 
Also, as noted in the Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1974, study, when faculty think 
of budgets, they think of adequate salaries; the findings here support hypothesis 6. 
Consistent with the respondents' perceptions of a budget as a means of assessing 
the effectiveness of others' responsible for budgeting, these data suggest that when 
the system is perceived to be effective in allocating budget amounts for 
expenditures, a positive attitude is likely to result. 
DISCUSSION 
For this Ontario sample of four small and medium universities, the findings 
suggest a perceived positive university environment, characterized by high faculty 
and administration budgetees' satisfaction, commitment, and budget attitude 
levels. It should be emphasized that significant differences were not found in 
the dependent measures when "administrative" and "academic" background 
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budgetees were compared. Dismayed that scarce provincial funding and a tight 
economy have constrained the university budgetary process, the pooled sample 
of budgetees in small and medium universities believed that the less-than-ideal 
situation could be made bearable where environments supporting fair budget 
control initiatives existed. 
Some shortcomings were noted, however. Overall, the budgetee respondents 
felt a lack of attachment to the budget system in their small-medium universities. 
This finding was noted in the perception by definition that a budget is primarily a 
measure of university administrators' competence. It was noted as well in the 
demonstrated interest in "local" or departmental budget actions as compared to the 
overall university budget activities. It was manifested also in the lack of personal 
accountability for variances that could or did occur at the local level. It was noted 
in a feeling of dismay over the universities' less-than-perfect external images and 
over the universities' less-than-perfect internal financial rewards. 
The pattern described above has some inherent "mixed messages" built into it 
regarding predictors of positive budget attitudes for those responsible for 
budgeting. On the one hand, there seems to be a cry by faculty, in particular, for 
optimizing their personal values of self-accomplishment and self-embellishment 
by allowing them to concentrate their time and energies on teaching and research. 
There is the concurrent suggestion that budgets are better left to fair and effective 
administrators, budget committees, and budget directors. On the other hand, there 
seems to be a more subtle message that the faculty in particular want to get 
involved in budget-setting at the "local" level, but the immediate superior seems 
not to be taking the initiative to get the faculty involved or to hold them 
accountable for variances that do occur at the local level. 
Before resolving these apparent contradictions, let's focus for the moment on 
the apparent predictors of positive budget attitudes that seem to be shared by 
administrators and faculty alike. First, respondents were not critical of overall 
allocations, pointing to the negative external pressures of provincial funding and a 
tight economy as causes of the constraints. Recognizing that the small-medium 
university is primarily a decentralized democracy, the budgetees seemed to 
suggest that with their limited time, budget decisions made at the local level were 
priorities for them; budget decisions made at broader levels were priorities for 
"fair" budget committees and budget administrators. 
Along this line, the roles of administrators, budget committees, and budget 
directors were at the focus for maintaining satisfaction levels for the community at 
large. Adequate consultation by the committees and directors to budgetees at the 
local level was a must. It is at this link-attitudes and superior-subordinate 
leadership styles - that the weakness in the chain becomes apparent. While there 
appears to be some consultation by superiors with subordinates at the local level 
regarding budgetary matters, accountability for budget variances at even the local 
level appear to be down-played by the superiors in this decentralized system. And 
where there is no accountability, there appears to be a lack of commitment to the 
budgetary process - at even the local level. The blame, then, for things that go 
24 Bernadette H. Schell and Debra Tarnopolsky 
wrong with budgets is displaced to responsible others within the system -
particularly the administrators. What is interesting, as noted above, is that our 
findings seem to suggest that budgetees at all levels of the small-medium 
universities would be prepared to be more behaviourally accountable for budget 
variances if superiors were more assertive in suggesting such. The performance 
assessment arena appears to be a distinct possibility for making such assertions. If 
such accountability for budget variances were to be put in place at the local level, 
clear-cut criteria should be established and transmitted to those responsible for 
budgeting. While this study did not ascertain which criteria could be useful in this 
regard, future research could address the question for this small-medium 
university setting. 
As a result of this study's findings, we feel that two pointers are worthy of 
consideration by administrators, budget committees, and budget directors in 
laying a framework for positive budgetary control. First, even in decentralized 
democracies, when resources are accepted by the majority as being scarce, the 
budgetees appear to prefer to make at least rudimentary budgetary decisions at the 
local level rather than to make no decisions at all or to have little input in the 
budget-setting process. Further, while they do not desire to spend lots of energy in 
making time-consuming judgements on priorities and broad-based decisions, they 
desire some accountability, given well-defined budget parameters and university-
wide objectives. While they do not seek the responsibility for inherent fiscal 
judgement calls, they expect that the budget committees and directors should be 
able to define a universal budget mandate to which all groups could steer their 
limited energies. The development of such university-wide fiscal objectives 
appears to be another weak link in the chain. Besides a lack of direction from 
superiors on the budget variance accountability issue, the respondents perceive a 
real need to develop universal targets that could pull the administrative and 
academic community together. At the present time, such targets appear to be 
lacking. 
Second, while the mean budget attitude appears to be high in the small-medium 
university setting, the results from this study indicate that the system could be 
improved. Perhaps linked to the above point, the findings seem to suggest that both 
administrative and faculty budgetees are losing sight of the overall university 
mandate. Without true involvement at even the local or departmental level, 
budgetees seem to be missing a psychological bond or emotional commitment to 
broader university goals and objectives. Perhaps the dissatisfaction expressed by 
the majority around the issue of external relations and long-range university plans 
was an overt expression of the need to be more personally involved in the budget 
process. In this study, while behavioural measures for budgetees' improving the 
external image were not measured directly, the findings suggest that such an area 
of study deserves further research. 
Finally, the results from this study indicate that the personal budget histories and 
values of budgetees appear to contribute little to developing a positive budget 
attitude in small and medium universities. However, clear-cut targets, a 
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consultative superior-subordinate leadership style, and accountability by budget-
ees at at least the local level appeared to be crucial. Such an equation suggests that 
budgetees are prepared to work hard at the individual level as long as a fair 
allocation process with competent budgeting committees and budgeting personnel 
exist, and as long as individuals can take home in their pockets their "fair share" of 
the financial pie. 
REFERENCES 
Alsup, R.G., Holland, M.L. & Jacobs, F.A. (1988). The Perceived Availability of Resources Which 
Contribute to Accounting Faculty Productivity. Journal of Accounting Education, 6 ,261-277. 
Argyris, C. (1952). The Impact of Budgets on People. New York: The Controllership Foundation. 
Arnold, L. (1981). How Do We Cut the Cake, ASurvey ofResource Allocation Procedures at Selected 
Canadian Universities. Toronto: Survey for the Canadian Association of Business Officers. 
Belanger, C. & Tremblay, L. (1982). A Methodological Approach to Selective Cutbacks. Canadian 
Journal of Higher Education, 12(3), 25-36. 
Bigoness, W.J. (1978). Correlates of Faculty Attitudes Toward Collective Bargaining. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 63, 228-239. 
Blau, P.M. (1973). The Organization of Academic Work. New York: Wiley. 
Brownell, P. (1982). The Role of Accounting Data in Performance Evaluation, Budgetary 
Participation, and Organizational Effectiveness. Journal of Accounting Research, 20(1), 
12-27. 
Bruns, W.J. & Waterhouse, J.H. (1975). Budgetary Control and Organization Structure. Journal of 
Accounting Research, 13(2), 177-203. 
Clancy, D.K. (1978). The Management Control Problems of Responsible Accounting. Management 
Accounting, 60, 35-39. 
Collins, F. (1978). The Interaction of Budget Characteristics and Personality Variables with Budgetary 
Response Attitudes. Accounting Review, 53, 324-335. 
Collins, F., Seiler, R.E. & Clancy, D.K. (1984). Budgetary Attitudes: The Effects of Role Senders, 
Stress and Performance Evaluation. Accounting and Business Research, 54, 163-168. 
Collins, F., Munter, P. & Finn, D.W. (1987). The Budgeting Games People Play. The Accounting 
Review 62(1), 29-49. 
Feuille, P. & Blandin, J. (1974). Faculty Job Satisfaction and Bargaining Sentiments: A Case Study. 
Academy of Management Journal, 17, 678-692. 
Gomez-Mejia, L.R. & Balkin, D.B. (1984). Faculty Satisfaction with Pay and Other Job Dimensions 
Under Union and Nonunion Conditions. Academy of Management Journal, 27, 591-602. 
Hardy, C., Langley, A., Mintzberg, H. & Rose, J. (1983). Strategy Formation in the University 
Setting. The Review of Higher Education, 6(4), 407-433. 
Hardy, C. (1984). The Management of University Cutbacks: Politics, Planning and Participation. 
Canadian Journal of Higher Education, 14(1), 79-89. 
Hardy, C. (1987). Using Content, Context and Process to Manage University Cutbacks. Canadian 
Journal of Higher Education, 17(1), 65-82. 
Hardy, C. (1988). Managing the Interest Groups in University Structures. Academy of Management 
Best Papers Proceedings, Frank Hoy (Ed.). Annaheim, California, pp. 362-366. 
Hirst, M.K. (1983). Reliance on Accounting Performance Measures, Task Uncertainty and 
Dysfunctional Behaviour: Some Extensions. Journal of Accounting Research, 21, 596-605. 
Hofstede, G.H. (1979). The Game of Budgetary Control. England: Tavistock, 1968. 
Kennis, I. (1979). Effects of Budgetary Goal Characteristics on Managerial Attitudes and 
Performance. Accounting Review, 54(4), 707-721. 
Lyne, S.R. (1988). The Role of the Budget in Medium and Large UK Companies and the Relationship 
with Budget Pressure and Participation. Accounting and Business Research, 18(71), 195-212. 
26 Bernadette H. Schell and Debra Tarnopolsky 
Merchant, K. (1981). The Design of Corporate Budgeting Systems: Influences on Managerial 
Behavior and Performance. Accounting Review, 56, 813-829. 
Mintzberg, H. (1979). The Structuring of Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Otley, D.T. (1977). Behavioural Aspects of Budgeting. Accounting Digest, 49. 
Otley, D.T. (1978). Budget Use and Managerial Performance. Journal of Accounting Research, 16, 
122-149. 
Parker, L.D. & Zammuto, R. (1986). Institutional Responses to Enrollment Decline: The Role of 
Perceptions. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of Higher 
Education, San Antonio, Texas. 
Pearson, M. (1986). Managing for Excellence or Walk the Jarratt Way. Paper presented at the 8th 
European Forum of the Association of Institutional Research, Loughborough, England. 
Pettigrew, A.M. (1984). Culture and Politics in Strategic Decision Making and Change. Paper 
presented at the Symposium on Strategic Decision Making in Complex Organizations. 
Columbia University, New York. 
Ponak, A. & Thompson, M. (1984). Faculty Collective Bargaining: The Voice of Experience. 
Relations Industrielles, 39, 449-463. 
Rokeach, M. (1973). The Nature of Human Values. New York: The Free Press, pp. 359-361. 
Ronen, J. & Livingstone, J.L. (1975). An Expectancy Theory Approach to the Motivational Impact of 
Budgets. Accounting Review, 50(4), 671-685. 
Schell, B.H. & Loeb, A.S. (1986). An Investigation of General Happiness Level, Collective 
Bargaining Attitudes, Job Satisfaction, and University and Union Commitment of Faculty 
Members in Canada. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 1(4), 537-556. 
Schiff, M. & Lewin, A.Y. (1970). The Impact of People on Budgets. Accounting Review, 45, 
259-268. 
Searfoss, R.G. & Monczha, R.M. (1973). Perceived Participation in the Budget Process and 
Motivation to Achieve the Budget. Academy of Management Journal, 16, 541-553. 
Stedry, A.C. (1960). Budget Controls and Cost Behavior. Englewood-Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Summers, E.L. (1972). An Inquiry into the Conditions Favoring Research by Members of an 
Accounting Faculty. In R.R. Sterling (Ed.), Research Methodology in Accounting, pp. 
137-151. Houston: Scholars Book Co. 
Taylor, F.W. (1947). Scientific Management. New York: Harper. 
Tosi, H. (1975). The Human Effects of Managerial Budgeting Systems. In J.L. Livingstone (Ed.), 
Management Accounting: The Behavioral Foundations. New York: Grid. 
Warmsley, G.L. & Zald, M.N. (1973). The Political Economy of Public Organizations. Public 
Administration Review, 33, 62-73. 
Weick, K.E. (1976). Organisations as Loosely Coupled Systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
21, 1 -19 . 
Zammuto, R.F. & Cameron, K.S. (1985). Environmental Decline and Organizational Response. 
Research in Organizational Behavior, 7, 223-262. 
